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Abstract
We explore how the separation between ownership and control affects
firm productivity. Using administrative panel data on the universe of lim-
ited liability firms in Finland, we document a substantial increase in pro-
ductivity when the CEO obtains majority ownership or when the major-
ity owner becomes the CEO. We exploit plausibly exogenous variations to
CEO turnover, induced by shocks to the CEO spouse’s health. Extending
the analysis beyond typical samples of large public firms, we show that our
effects are stronger in medium-sized private firms. We also investigate pos-
sible mechanisms and provide suggestive evidence that increased ownership
boosts CEO’s effort at work.
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1 Introduction
Policymakers around the world devote considerable resources to promote the de-
velopment of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with targeted policies
including easier access to credit, advantageous tax treatments, lighter regulatory
burdens.1 SME-specific policies have also been a common response to the Covid
crisis.2 One rationale behind those measures is that SMEs are key for job creation,
innovation, and growth.3 At the same time, often because of data limitations, it
is not clear how effi ciently those firms allocate their resources.
A particularly important source of ineffi ciency could come from agency con-
flicts. The separation between ownership and control, and its consequences in
terms of firms’investment and financing decisions, have been at the heart of much
of the corporate finance literature, starting at least with Berle and Means (1932)
and Jensen and Meckling (1976). At the same time, direct measures of agency
costs are diffi cult to obtain, particularly so for privately owned SMEs. An open
question is whether in these firms agency costs could be even more important than
in large public firms, since for example SMEs face less stringent regulatory con-
straints and weaker outside markets for corporate control, as argued for example
in Bitler, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2005).
In this paper, we aim at estimating agency costs on a large sample of firms,
including privately owned SMEs. From an empirical viewpoint, the exercise re-
quires confronting (at least) two major obstacles. The first is data availability.
Ideally, the question requires having detailed information on the firms’operations
and outcomes, on their employees and on their ownership structure. While both
firm micro data and matched employer—employee data are increasingly available,
firm ownership structure is typically observed only for listed firms. These are a
tiny and not necessarily representative minority of the population of firms. More-
over, in these firms there is basically always separation between ownership and
control, which makes it diffi cult to define a clear benchmark in which agency costs
are minimized.
A second key challenge is that ownership and control are not randomly as-
1See for example the Small Business Jobs Act in the US or the SME Strategy for a sustainable
and digital Europe in the EU.
2See e.g. OECD’s report on Policy Responses to Coronavirus (COVID-19), July 2020.
3See e.g. Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2011), Li and Rama (2015), Martin,
Nataraj and Harrison (2017) for recent discussions.
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signed, they may themselves be determined by firm outcomes or by possibly un-
observed factors affecting also firm outcomes. This makes it hard to interpret
these relations as causal, and to provide clear guidance to the corporate gover-
nance policy debate.
We address these issues by exploiting administrative panel data covering the
universe of limited liability firms in Finland. We have access to a rich set of in-
formation on the firm’s balance sheet, on its employees and, importantly, on its
ownership structure in terms of holdings and identity of ultimate shareholders.
This offers the unique opportunity to investigate the effects of ownership and con-
trol in the entire population of firms, and to uncover whether agency conflicts can
be even costlier outside typical samples of listed firms. The exceptional richness
of these data will also allow to address in a novel way some issues related to the
endogeneity of ownership and control, as we detail below.
Our setting is also interesting in terms of external validity. Finland as a country
scores very highly in terms of corporate governance; for example, it was ranked
first in the world by the World Bank’s Corporate Governance Index (Kaufmann
(2004)). As we will see, we obtain large estimates of agency costs, and this is
remarkable especially in a setting in which, under this perspective, those costs
should be minimal.
The logic of our empirical exercise is straightforward. We design a procedure
(explained below) to identify the CEO among the firm’s employees, and assume
that the firm’s operations are under the effective control of the CEO.4 We define
our baseline treatment variable in a simple way: we say that there is no separation
between ownership and control when the CEO is the majority shareholder (in
robustness checks, we consider other thresholds of CEO ownership). We then
compare firm productivity, defined in our baseline specification as value added per
worker, when ownership and control are in the same hands relative to when they
are separated.
We start with fixed-effects regressions in which we exploit variations in CEO
ownership within the same firm with the same CEO. That is, we compare firm
productivity within the same firm-CEO pair in years in which the CEO is the
majority owner vs. years in which ownership and controls are separated. In
addition to any common time trend, this specification allows to capture any time-
invariant characteristic of the firm, of the CEO, and of the firm-CEO match. In
4Using the terminology in Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997), we say that the CEO has
effective control, irrespective of whether or not she has formal control in the firm. Aghion and
Tirole (1997) make a similar distinction between formal and real authority.
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a similar way, we also define pairs in terms of a firm and its largest owner, and
estimate changes in firm productivity, within the same firm-owner pair, in years
in which the largest owner is the CEO vs. years in which the two are separated.
These specifications consistently show that firm productivity is significantly larger
when the CEO is also the majority owner. In our preferred specification, having
the CEO owner is associated with an increase of 1, 000 euros in the output per
worker, which corresponds to a 1.9% increase in labor productivity. The effect is
large, as compared for example to an average productivity growth in our sample
of 0.7%.
We show that the effect is driven by changes in CEO ownership and not by
any change in the ownership structure or by any CEO change. Moreover, the
effect is robust to alternative definitions of treatment and to alternative measures
of productivity and profitability as well as to several specification tests.
A causal interpretation of these results requires that unobserved heterogene-
ity is time invariant within a given firm-CEO or a given firm-owner pair. This
assumption may be violated if unobserved pair-specific shocks induce a change in
CEO ownership and at the same time affect future firm productivity. For example,
the CEO may decide to change her ownership shares in response to her private
information about the firm’s prospects. An ideal setting to address these concerns
would be one in which the CEO has majority ownership and for exogenous rea-
sons she has to step down as CEO while at the same time keeping her shares (this
would induce a separation between ownership and control) or symmetrically a sit-
uation in which the CEO is not the owner and, as result of an exogenous shock,
she gets replaced by the owner (this would bring together ownership and control).
Our IV procedure attempts to mimic such ideal situations by exploiting shocks to
CEO ownership induced by CEO’s retirement, by worsened health conditions of
the CEO, and of the CEO spouse. These shocks may induce the CEO to leave,
without necessarily affecting her ownership shares. Depending on whether the
CEO is also the owner, these shocks may induce a positive or a negative change
to our treatment variable.
The CEO retirement decision may be useful as it is partly driven by reasons
that are orthogonal to the future productivity of the firm (see Weisbach (1995)
and Denis and Denis (1995) for studies employing this instrument). At the same
time, the decision is voluntary and as such it may be related to unobservable
confounding factors. We then look at CEO changes induced by shocks to CEO’s
health. We can construct for each CEO the amount of health benefits paid out
from the Finnish health insurance scheme. Increased health benefits are associated
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to worsened health conditions. In a similar and somewhat more extreme way,
CEO’s health shocks have been exploited also in the literature using CEO death
(e.g. Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985), Jenter, Matveyev and
Roth (2018), Becker and Hvide (2019)) and CEO hospitalization (Bennedsen,
Pérez-González and Wolfenzon (2012)).
When exploiting CEO’s health shocks, we can allow for direct contemporaneous
effects of CEO’s health on firm productivity as well as for the possibility that past
firm performance affects current CEO’s health. We need however that current
CEO’s health is not directly associated to future firm productivity. In order to
relax this assumption, one would like to exploit shocks that induce the CEO to
resign but are orthogonal to any dynamics occurring within the firm. A key aspect
of our data is that they allow us to recover the amount of health benefits paid out
to the CEO spouse, and so consider shocks to the CEO spouse’s health. In order
to make the test even sharper, we restrict to CEO spouses who are not working
in the firm and have no direct effect on the firm operations.
The IV estimates confirm our results, showing that firm productivity is sig-
nificantly larger when ownership and control are in the same hands. Estimated
coeffi cients are similar across specifications, and in fact larger than the OLS coun-
terpart. Having the CEO owner induces an increase of about 1, 500 euros in the
output per worker, which corresponds to a 2.8% increase in labor productivity.
This is confirmed in various robustness checks.
The validity of our instruments requires that their effect is only mediated by
the change in the treatment, i.e., by CEO changes associated to ownership changes,
as opposed to CEO changes per se. This assumption can be questioned in light of
studies (reviewed below) showing that CEO’s departures may directly affect firm
value. We perform a series of placebo regressions in which our shocks are used
to induce changes in CEOs not associated to changes in ownership. While indeed
our instruments are strongly related to CEO departures, we show that it is not
a change in CEO per se that drives our effects, but CEO changes associated to
ownership changes.
A key question for our investigation, as mentioned, is how our results compare
to estimates obtained in typical sample of large or listed firms, and in partic-
ular whether agency conflicts could be significant even in SMEs. We start by
replicating some existing results showing that in listed firms the effect of CEO
ownership on productivity is inverted U-shaped, and in fact overall it is negative.
We show however that these effects cannot be found outside the sample of listed
firms. Rather, we show that agency costs are larger in medium-sized private firms,
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those with 51-250 employees. As we discuss below, this result does not seem an
artifact of our statistical tests; rather, as in Bitler et al. (2005), it suggests that
medium-sized private firms can be more exposed to agency costs as they may face
larger managerial discretion and larger monitoring costs than small firms, while at
the same time being less constrained by regulation or market pressures than large
public firms. These results are confirmed when employing the same IV specifica-
tions described above, interacting our treatment indicator with firm size. They
highlight the importance of exploring agency costs outside typical samples. The
estimates one gets in our broader sample are richer, and they suggest that agency
costs may be particularly severe in firms that, due to data limitations, are often
excluded from corporate governance studies.
Our last set of results aims at investigating what are plausible mechanisms
through which agency costs affect firm productivity in our setting.
We show that our effects are larger in industries where productivity dispersion
is larger, which can be interpreted as industries with potentially larger scope for
ineffi ciencies. We also show that, while we have no direct way to identify family
firms in our setting, our effects are significantly larger in firms run by professional
managers. We then try to further distinguish between explanations based on em-
pire building vs. quiet life motives (see Stein (2003) for a review). We consider
several variables often associated to empire building such as investments, capex,
acquisition activities, cash holdings, leverage, dividends, and find no significant
changes in these variables in relation to our treatment. Related to quiet life,
ideally we would like to measure CEO’s effort at work, which is not directly ob-
servable. Our data however provide some useful proxies. We observe the number
of employment relations the CEO has in other firms and the number of days the
CEO has been absent from work. We show both in OLS and in IV regressions
that our treatment induces the CEO to take fewer external engagements and fewer
days off. These results are suggestive that the quiet life hypothesis is a plausible
mechanism behind our treatment effects. When the CEO is also the owner, she
exerts more effort at work.
This paper contributes to the literature on CEO ownership and firm perfor-
mance. As mentioned, often due to data limitations, this literature has typically
focused on listed or very large firms.5 Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) is one of the few
5Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) document an inverted U-shaped relation between CEO
ownership and Tobin’s Q on Fortune500 firms; a similar relation is found in McConnell and
Servaes (1990) on a sample of listed firms. Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014) show that firms
with larger CEO ownership provide larger stock market returns and suggest this is due to reduced
agency conflicts. Fabisik, Fahlenbrach, Stulz and Taillard (2018) expand the sample to about
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studies investigating small private firms. They define the Jensen and Meckling’s
zero agency costs benchmark as a situation in which the CEO is the only owner
and show that firms further away from this benchmark are less effi cient. Similarly,
Bitler et al. (2005) show a positive relation between ownership share and firm
performance in a cross-section of U.S. entrepreneurs. Most of these studies rely on
cross-sectional comparisons, while effects are hardly significant when adding firm
fixed effects, possibly due to limited time-series variation (Himmelberg, Hubbard
and Palia (1999), Zhou (2001)). Instead, our data cover the universe of limited
liability firms over a relatively long panel, that allows exploiting significant time-
series variations. We estimate our effects not only within firms, but within firms
with the same CEO or the same largest owner.
Our results are also related to the literature on family firms, and in particular
to studies investigating how having a member of the family as CEO affects firm
value. Pérez-González (2006), Bennedsen, Nielsen, Pérez-González and Wolfenzon
(2007), Bandiera, Lemos, Prat and Sadun (2017) for example show detrimental
effects of family CEOs, while Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Villalonga and Amit
(2006) provide a less negative view. Our focus is on agency issues within firm-CEO
pairs, hence controlling for the quality of the CEO and of the firm-CEO match.
We also discuss whether our effects are different in firms which are more likely to
be run by family members.
More broadly, our work provides distinct and complementary insights to several
themes in corporate governance. Relative to studies looking at how firm value is
affected by CEO characteristics (e.g. Bertrand and Schoar (2003)) or by the firm-
CEOmatch (Bandiera, Guiso, Prat and Sadun (2015); Bandiera, Prat, Hansen and
Sadun (2020)), we focus on the effects of varying the CEO’s ownership share within
a given firm-CEO pair. Relative to studies on how ownership structure affects
firm value (e.g. Edmans and Holderness (2017)), our focus is on CEO ownership,
keeping other characteristics of the ownership structure fixed. In particular, we
abstract from how the firm’s ownership structure affects the degree of effective
control over the firm’s operations, which we assume is fully in CEO’s hands. Lastly,
differently from the literature on majority vs. minority shareholders (Shleifer and
Vishny (1997)), we focus on the possibility of agency conflicts between the CEO
and the majority owner.




We exploit the Finnish Longitudinal Owner-Employer-Employee database (FLOWN)
constructed by Statistics Finland, which we match with balance sheet information
from the business register. We obtain a yearly panel from 2006 to 2014 covering
the universe of limited companies (osakeyhtiö) in the private sector. Our data
have three main features. First, we have a rich set of information on firms’char-
acteristics, operations and performance given by their balance sheet. Second, the
matched employer-employee structure allows to have information on the employees
of the firm, and in particular, as we explain below, to identify its CEO. Third, and
most distinctively, we have detailed information on the firms’ownership structure.
The Finnish tax authority requires that firms report the identity of the 10 largest
shareholders or, if there are more than 10 shareholders, of any shareholder with
more than 10% of firm shares. Statistics Finland builds on this information to
identify the ultimate individual shareholders of each firm.6
We exclude one-man companies and holding companies (tpically financial firms)
with no proper business activity, and we are left with around 110,000 firms. In our
sample, the median firm has 4 employees, 78% of firms are micro firms with less
than 10 employees, 18% of firms are small (10-50 employees), 3% are medium (51-
250 employees), and 0.8% are large (>250 employees). Manufacturing firms are
36% of the sample (including construction) while the rest are services (including
trade).
CEO We are interested in identifying the CEO in each firm, interpreted as the
person who has control on the firm’s operations. We follow a sequential procedure,
similar to the one employed e.g. in Queiró (2016). First, we identify a person as
the CEO if he or she is explicitly defined as such among the list of employees.
This is the case for 7% of the firms. For the remaining firms, we consider those
employees identified as having managerial responsibilities, and say that the CEO
is the manager with the highest salary. This identifies an additional 30% of the
CEOs. For the remaining firms, we look at whether an active entrepreneur (as
classified by the tax administration) appears in the list of employees, in which case
6Identifying the ultimate owners is complicated also by the possibility of linkages of firms
and business owners via holding companies and enterprise groups. Statistics Finland has imple-
mented a procedure to track down the individual owners behind each firm along the ownership
chains. Maliranta and Nurmi (2019) provide a detailed presentation of the data, whose closest
counterpart are the Norwegian data used in Berglann, Moen, Røed and Skogstrøm (2011).
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the person is identified as the CEO.7 This is the case for 23% of our CEOs. The
remaining 41% of the CEOs are defined as the highest paid worker in the firm. As
a validation test, we notice that 86% of the CEOs explicitly defined as such (our
first criterion) also have the highest salary in the firm.
Ownership We observe some ownership information for 92% of the firms in our
sample; on average, we observe 82% of the firm ownership. Ownership tends to be
rather concentrated: 39.5% of our firms have one shareholder, the median number
of shareholders is 2, and 29.9% of the firms have more than 2 shareholders. In
firms with more than one shareholder, the average ownership share of the largest
shareholder is 41%.
We are interested in comparing situations in which, within a given firm and for
plausibly exogenous reasons, the CEO becomes the owner or the owner becomes
the CEO, in which case we say that ownership and control are in the same hands,
relative to situations in which the two are separated. This requires extending the
Jensen-Meckling’s zero agency costs benchmark mentioned above and define the
firm’s owner when the firm has multiple shareholders. In our baseline analysis, we
focus on the majority owner and accordingly we define our treatment variable as
the dummy CEO Owner, which equals one when the majority owner is also the
CEO.
While our empirical strategy requires defining a dichotomous measure of treat-
ment, we attach no specific value to the 50% threshold in terms of CEO ownership.
In fact, as detailed below, changes in our treatment variable are typically asso-
ciated to large changes in CEO ownership, as opposed to local changes around
the 50% threshold. We will show the robustness of our results when considering
alternative thresholds.
In our sample, the CEO is also the majority owner in 29% of the firms, and
10.5% of the firms experience a change in the treatment, in 5.6% of the cases the
CEO obtains majority, and in the remaining 4.9% the CEO loses majority. As
intuitive, these changes are more likely to occur in micro and small firms. We
observe large variations in CEO ownership. Conditional on observing a positive
change, the average ownership change is 50%; conditional on a negative change,
the average is −43%.8 Out of these changes, 26% are associated to a change in
7The tax administration identifies an active entrepreneur in a firm if a person owns at least
30% of the shares and receives a significant income from the firm (at least 9,663 euros in 2006).
8In fact, these figures are similar to observed changes in ownership of the largest shareholder
(whether or not she is the CEO) for which, conditional on a positive change, the average is 43%
and, conditional on a negative change, the average is −38%.
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the majority owner and so in our treatment CEO Owner. Conditional on having a
change in the treatment, the average ownership change is 73% for positive changes
and −76% for negative changes.
Productivity Our main interest is to investigate how our treatment affects
firm’s productivity. In most of our analysis, we define productivity as value added
(in real terms) over full time equivalent units of labor.9 The measure is con-
structed directly by Statistics Finland in a way that is comparable across firms
and over time. It measures the value of the output generated by a worker in the
firm without having to estimate the value of capital in the firm, which may be
problematic for some firms in our sample (e.g. micro service firms). It does not
measure profit and it does not serve as a tax base, so it may be less subject to
discretionary accounting practices.10
We will check the robustness of our results when employing other effi ciency
and profitability measures (described in more details below). We will also consider
productivity measures based on standard TFP estimates, and we will account for
possible biases induced by the inability to observe firm level prices.
We winsorize all financial variables, including productivity measures, at the




The first set of results are based on fixed-effects OLS regressions in which we
exploit variations in CEO ownership within the same firm with the same CEO.
Our basic specification is
yj,t = αj + βTj,t +X
′
j,tγ + µt + εj,t, (1)
where j denotes a firm-CEO pair, yj,t is the productivity of firm-CEO j in year t, αj
and µt are respectively firm-CEO and year fixed effects, and Tj,t, is a dummy equal
to one when the CEO owns more than 50% of the firm shares. Our baseline set of
9Value added is defined as the value of sales minus the value of purchases, accounting for
changes in stocks, other operating incomes and product taxes. An industry specific index based
on 2010 prices is used to deflate the nominal value added.




j,t includes industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy
indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level
of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership
concentration and characteristics of the firm’s board of directors (total number of
members, number of members working in the firm, total fraction of shares held
by board members).11 In specifications without CEO fixed effects, we also include
CEO’s education, age, tenure and experience. We cluster standard errors at the
firm level. Our coeffi cient of interest is β, which measures productivity differences
within the same firm-CEO pair in years in which the CEO is the majority owner
vs. years in which ownership and controls are separated.
Table 2 reports our estimates. In column 1, we include no control and no fixed
effects and observe a negative relation between CEO Owner and firm productivity.
Once we include our set of controls (column 2) and firmfixed effects (column 3), the
relation turns positive. Our preferred specification is reported in column 4, which
corresponds to equation (1) and includes firm-CEO fixed effects.12 According to
these estimates, CEO Owner is associated to around 1, 000 euros larger output per
worker, that corresponds to a 1.9% increase relative to the unconditional mean.
This effect is large. As comparison, the average productivity growth of private
sector Finnish firms in our sample period is 0.7% per year.13
The estimated impact in column 4 includes cases in which the CEO becomes
the majority shareholder (Tj,t − Tj,t−1 = 1) and cases in which the CEO loses
the status of majority shareholder (Tj,t − Tj,t−1 = −1). One may ask whether, in
absolute value, the effects associated to the two variations are different. In column
5, we investigate whether the estimated effects of CEO Owner are heterogenous
with respect to its lagged value Tj,t−1 and observe that the interaction term Tj,t ∗
Tj,t−1 is not statistically significant. This suggests no significant asymmetries
between the two effects, an observation we will use again in our IV estimates.
In order to support our interpretation, we wish to make sure that our estimates
capture the specific effect of changes in CEO ownership, as opposed to any change
in the ownership structure. In column 6, we consider the dummy Owner Change,
which equals one when the majority owner changes from period t − 1 to t and
in any subsequent period, irrespective of whether or not this is associated to a
11Omitting firms that are part of a business group would not change our results.
12As we include firm-CEO fixed effects, we do not include controls for CEO’s education, age,
experience; hence the higher number of observations relative to column 3. Including those
controls would not change our results. Moreover, if we restrict the regression in column 4 to the
same sample as in column 3, the estimated coeffi cient is very similar (equal to 1087).
13The corresponding figure for EU countries is 0.9% and for the US is 1.13%, see the OECD’s
website at data.oecd.org.
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change in CEO ownership. We show no significant impact on productivity in this
case, suggesting that our effects are related to changes in CEO ownership and not
to any change in ownership.
3.2 IV estimates
A causal interpretation of our OLS estimates may be challenged for example on
the basis that the CEO has private information on the future firm productivity
and decides to acquire majority shares in anticipation of a productivity increase.
More generally, changes in ownership and control may be correlated to unobserved
pair-specific shocks that may also be correlated to future productivity. Ideally,
one would like to exploit purely random changes on whether the main owner
is also the CEO. For example, one would like to observe a firm in which the
CEO has majority ownership and for exogenous reasons she has to step down as
CEO while at the same time keeping her shares, which would induce a separation
between ownership and control within the same firm and with the same ownership
structure. Symmetrically, one can consider a firm in which the CEO is not the
owner, she is induced to leave, and she is replaced by the owner, so that ownership
and control end up being in the same hands. In the next analysis, we attempt to
get as close as possible to such ideal situations. We define pairs in terms of firm
and largest owner and exploit shocks induced by CEO’s retirement, by worsened
health conditions of the CEO, and of the CEO spouse.
3.2.1 Instruments
Our first instrument exploits changes in the CEO due to retirement. The re-
tirement decision is partly driven by reasons that are orthogonal to the future
productivity of the firm and, in fact, it has been used by the literature to investi-
gate the effects of CEOs on firm value (Weisbach (1995), Denis and Denis (1995)).
We define the dummy CEO Retire that equals one if the CEO is older than the
legal retirement age (63 years old) or receives pension benefits at t.
A potential issue with retirement is that its decision is voluntary and as such
may be related to unobservable confounding factors. For example, a CEO may
decide to retire when she expects a decline in firm productivity. We address this
concern by considering a second instrument, based on shocks to the CEO’s health.
For each CEO, we obtain the amount of health benefits paid out from the Finnish
health insurance scheme. The scheme is mandatory, universal, and it compensates
the beneficiary for income losses related to health issues. An increase in health
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benefit is due to worsened health conditions. Relative to CEO changes induced
by retirement, health shocks are less likely to be driven by expected productivity
shocks. The logic of the instrument generalizes, in a somewhat less extreme way,
a classic approach of using CEO death as a shock (Johnson et al. (1985), Jenter
et al. (2018), Becker and Hvide (2019)) and the approach by Bennedsen et al.
(2012), who use CEO hospitalization events in Danish firms.
We use CEO’s health at t − 1 as an instrument for changes in the CEO from
t− 1 to t. The validity of our instrument does not rely on excluding direct effects
of CEO’s health at t on firm productivity at t, we use past health shocks to induce
changes in the CEO. One may also conjecture that past firm performance may
affect current CEO’s health. If the CEO changes associated to our health shocks
were driven by past firm productivity, however, we would observe a violation of
parallel trends, which is not the case. A remaining issue may be that current
CEO’s health is directly associated to future firm productivity.
In order to take this possibility into account, one should consider health shocks
that induce the CEO to resign but are orthogonal to any dynamics occurring within
the firm. One such case is a shock to the CEO spouse’s health. The exceptional
richness of the data allows us to recover the amount of health benefit paid to the
CEO spouse, again by the national health insurance scheme. In fact, to make
this test even sharper, we can restrict to CEO spouses who are not working in
the firm and so have no direct effect on the firm operations. To our knowledge,
this instrument is novel and, in our view, considerably less exposed to the above-
mentioned concerns.
In order to appreciate our identification assumption, notice that health shocks
induce plausibly exogenous variations in CEO turnover, but they do not necessarily
affect her ownership shares. Their validity as instruments requires that their effect
on future firm’s productivity is only mediated by the change in the treatment. We
then distinguish shocks to productivity that are driven purely by the change of
the CEO from those driven by the change in the treatment, i.e. by CEO changes
associated to ownership changes, as we explain below.
3.2.2 Specifications
Before turning to our IV estimates, we start with an OLS estimate of
yi,t = αi + βTi,t +X
′
i,tγ + µt + εi,t, (2)
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in which all terms are as in equation (1) except that we define a pair i in terms
of a firm and its largest owner. In equation (2), the coeffi cient β describes what
happens to firm productivity, within a given firm-owner pair, in years in which the
owner is also the CEO vs. years in which the two are separated. While equation (1)
exploits variations associated to the CEO becoming (or stopping being) the owner,
equation (2) exploits variations associated to the owner becoming (or stopping
being) the CEO. For the purpose of estimating agency costs, both variations should
lead to similar insights. There are two reasons for focusing on specification (2)
for the next analysis. First, as further discussed below, it helps addressing the
above-mentioned concerns about the CEO having private information about the
future profitability of the firm. Second, we view our instruments as shocks that
may force the CEO to leave the firm, and so induce variations within a given
firm-owner pair.
In order to implement our IV approach, we consider two specific features of
our setting. First, our variable of interest Ti,t is a dummy. In fact, we are not
instrumenting CEO ownership share per se, but rather whether or not the main
owner is also the CEO. For this reason, we first estimate a probit regression in
which Ti,t is regressed over a given instrument Zi,t−1 and a set of controls. Then, we
use the predicted T̂i,t as an instrument in a standard 2SLS regression. As shown
in Wooldridge (2010), this allows improving the effi ciency of our estimator and
obtaining an estimate of the average treatment effect, which is easier to compare
to OLS estimates. Moreover, the procedure is robust to possible misspecifications
in the probit equation and it does not require considering generated regressor
issues.14
A second observation is that the effect of a given instrument Zi,t−1 on our treat-
ment Ti,t depends on Ti,t−1. When the CEO is the owner at t− 1, the instrument
(say, a shock to CEO’s health) may induce the CEO to leave and so possibly a
negative change to the treatment, from Ti,t−1 = 1 to Ti,t = 0. When the CEO
is not the owner at t − 1, the instrument may induce a positive change in the
treatment, from Ti,t−1 = 0 to Ti,t = 1.
Accordingly, our IV estimates are based on the following procedure. First, we
estimate the probit regression
Ti,t = Φ(α + β1Zi,t−1 + β2Zi,t−1(1− Ti,t−1) + β3(1− Ti,t−1) +X
′
i,tγ), (3)
14See Wooldridge (2010) also for a discussion of why the probit regression cannot be used
directly as the first stage.
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in which Zi,t−1 is one of the above mentioned instrument and in which β1 mea-
sures the effect of the instrument on Ti,t when Ti,t−1 = 1. This case is of particular
interest, as the instrument induces a plausibly exogenous separation between own-
ership and control. As mentioned, we then use the predicted T̂i,t as instrument in
a 2SLS in which the first stage is a standard OLS.
3.2.3 Results
We present our results in Table 3. In column 1, we report OLS estimates of equa-
tion (2), showing that, in the same firm with the same owner, firm productivity
is larger when the owner is also the CEO. As mentioned, the result is useful to
address the concern with specification (1) that the CEO may decide to acquire
ownership as she expects an increase in future profitability. In equation (2), in-
stead, it is the owner who decides to become the CEO and the variation is less
likely to be driven by the CEO’s private information.15 This result also confirms
our estimates in Table 2 and it serves as a useful benchmark for the next IV
estimates.
The results of our IV procedure are reported in columns 2-5. The bottom part
of the table reports the probit estimates of equation (3), not the first stage of the
2SLS. The coeffi cient on Zi,t−1 is negative, showing that our instruments have a
significant impact on the treatment. If the CEO is the owner at t − 1 and, for
example, she becomes sick, she is more likely to leave and so induce a negative
shock to the treatment. In column 2, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if
the CEO has retired. In column 3, the instrument is the amount of health benefits
received by the CEO at t−1 (in 10,000 euros). In column 4, the instrument is the
amount of health benefits received by the CEO spouse.16 In column 5 the sample
is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. Results
in columns 2-5 reveal a robust effect. Exploiting plausibly exogenous shocks, we
show that firm productivity is significantly larger when ownership and control are
in the same hands. Estimated coeffi cients are similar across specifications, and if
anything, larger than the OLS counterpart. IV estimates show that our treatment
CEO Owner induces an increase of about 1, 500 euros in the output per worker,
which corresponds to a 2.8% increase in labor productivity.
15The CEO may decide to leave as he expects future productivity to decrease, but this would
go against our results.
16In order to keep the same sample throughout columns 2-4, we set health benefit to zero
when the CEO has no spouse (that is, we make no distinction between having a spouse with no
health benefits and having no spouse). Restricting our sample to CEOs with a spouse would
give very similar estimates in terms both of magnitude and of standard errors.
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The validity of our instrument requires that our shocks affect firm productivity
at t only thought the induced change in the treatment. This is not an obvious
assumption. For example, the CEO’s departure may directly affect firm produc-
tivity, say because she has specific skills or knowledge of the firm. As mentioned
above, several studies have identified an effect of CEO characteristics on firm’s
performance (including Bertrand and Schoar (2003), Anderson and Reeb (2003),
Pérez-González (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006) , Bennedsen et al. (2007),
Bandiera et al. (2017)). Moreover, the effect of the CEO’s departure may be par-
ticularly large when the departure is unexpected (Smith, Yagan, Zidar and Zwick
(2019)). In order to investigate this further, we check whether any change in CEOs
induced by our instruments has a similar effect on firm productivity, irrespective
of whether or not it is associated to an ownership change. If this were the case,
the validity of our instrument would be questioned.
We report our results in Table 4, which replicates the structure of Table 3 but
looks instead to the effect of CEO Change, that is a dummy equal to one if the
CEO changes from t − 1 to t and in any subsequent period. In column 1, we
report OLS estimates and show no significant effect. Compared to the estimate
in column 1 of Table 3, this shows that it is not a change in CEO per se that
drives our effects on firm productivity, but CEO changes associated to ownership
changes.
This is confirmed in IV estimates in columns 2-5. The estimation procedure
is the same as in Table 3, except that there is no need to consider the interaction
between Zi,t−1 and CEO Change at t − 1 in the probit. In fact, in this case, the
effect of our instrument on the probability to have a change of CEO at t need
not depend on whether the CEO has changed at t − 1. The probit coeffi cient on
Zi,t−1 is positive, showing that our instruments indeed significantly increase the
probability of having a change in the CEO. Importantly, however, these changes
have very different effects on firm productivity from those which we capture with
our treatment (i.e., those associated to changes in ownership).17 We view this as
an important finding in support of the validity of our instruments.
4 Small and Large Firms
As mentioned, most of the literature on CEO ownership focuses on samples of very
large and/or listed firms. A question is whether the effects identified on those firms
17The difference in the coeffi cients is statistically different from zero.
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are representative of the population and, specifically, whether small and medium
sized firms may also face significant agency costs.
We explore this issue in Table 5. In column 1, we check whether our estimates
of agency costs vary with the size of the firm. We interact our treatment indicator
with the dummies Small, Medium, and Large, indicating respectively that the
firm has 10-50 employees, 51-250 employees, or more than 250 employees. The
omitted category are micro firms with less than 10 employees. Estimated agency
costs appear largest for firms with 51-250 employees.
In column 2, we interact our treatment with a dummy indicating whether the
firm is in the service (as opposed to the manufacturing) sector, and we observe that
agency costs are significantly larger in manufacturing firms. In column 3, we show
that our effects are stronger in industries where the potential scope for ineffi ciencies
is larger, as measured by a larger dispersion in the industry’s productivity.
In order to highlight the effects on listed firms, in columns 4-6, we consider the
continuous measure CEO share, that is the fraction of shares held by the CEO,
instead of CEO Owner. In listed firms, it is hardly the case that the CEO is
the majority shareholder. As shown in column 5, the effect on non-listed firm
is positive, while the effect on listed firm is negative. That is, differently than
in most firms, larger CEO ownership is associated to lower productivity in listed
firms. The result is consistent with Fabisik et al. (2018) who focus on listed firms.
It has also been shown that, in listed US firms, the relation between CEO
ownership and firm value is inverted U-shaped (Morck et al. (1988), McConnell
and Servaes (1990)). Indeed, if we restrict to listed firms, this is the case in our
sample as well (column 6). However, such non-linearity is not so strong (in fact,
the squared term is not significantly different from zero) in the broader sample
including non-listed firms.
We further explore how agency costs vary with the size of the firm using the
same IV specifications as in Section 3.2. We interact each instrument with a
dummy indicating whether the firm is micro, small, medium or large. Results are
reported in Table 6. While some of these estimates are less precise, they confirm
the view that agency costs are important also outside typical samples of large firms.
In fact, agency costs appear particuraly significant in medium-sized private firms.
This is unlikely to be an artifact of our statistical tests.18 A possible interpretation
of our finding is that, relative to small and micro firms, there is larger scope for
18As mentioned, changes in our treatment variable are more likely to occur in small and micro
firms, where they also tend to be associated to larger changes in CEO ownership. Hence, from
a statistical viewpoint, one may expect our effects to be larger and more precisely estimated in
those firms.
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managerial discretion and it is harder to monitor the CEO in medium-sized firms.
At the same time, relative to large public firms, medium-sized firms face less
stringent regulatory constraints and weaker outside markets for corporate control
(see Bitler et al. (2005) for a similar argument). While further evidence is needed
to shed light on these mechanisms, a key implication of our analysis is that agency
costs may be particularly severe in those firms that, due to data limitations, are
often excluded from corporate governance studies.
5 Interpretation
We further discuss our results by focusing on two questions. First, what is the
role of family firms in driving our results; and second, which are the mechanisms
linking agency costs to firm productivity in our setting.
5.1 Family Firms and Founder Effect
As mentioned, a large literature on family firms explores how firm value is affected
when members of the family or external professionals are appointed as CEOs.
Similar issues arise when the founder of the firm, who typically holds specific and
possibly essential assets, is replaced. A natural question is whether our results
are different in family firms and whether they are driven by the departure of the
founder.
While we have no direct way to identify family firms in our sample, we can
employ two proxies. We define family firms as those in which the CEO spouse
appears in the list of employees or those in which the CEO spouse owns some
share in the firm. In columns 1-3 of Table 7, we see that our effects do not vary
significantly between family vs. non-family firms.
Similarly, we have no direct way to identify firms run by the founder for all
firms our sample. As an approximation, we define founder firms as those which
are created during our sample (i.e., after 2006) and in which the CEO has not
changed. In column 4 of Table 7, we see that our effects are stronger in firms
which are not run by the founder. As shown in column 5, however, we cannot
rule out that this differential effect is driven by firm age, i.e., by the fact that our
effects are stronger in older firms (those created before 2006). When we restrict to
firms created during the sample, the treatment effect is not statistically different
in founder firms.
A related question is whether CEOs in our sample are professional managers,
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and whether CEO ownership changes are truly about agency costs, as opposed to
dynamics occurring among family or friends. We proxy firms managed by profes-
sionals as those with at least two different CEOs or as those in which the current
CEO has worked in at least two different firms during our sample. We observe
in column 6 that our effects are significantly larger in firms run by professional
managers, supporting the interpretation that these effects are driven by agency
costs.
5.2 Mechanisms
We investigate some possible mechanisms through which agency costs affect firm
productivity. Indirectly, this can also shed light on which types of agency costs
matter the most in our setting (see e.g. Stein (2003) for a review). We distinguish
in particular between empire building, according to which agency costs are driven
by the manager’s tendency to undertake ineffi cient projects (Jensen (1986)), and
quiet life, according to which agency costs are driven by the manager’s tendency
to put low effort at work (Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), Giroud and Mueller
(2010), Bandiera et al. (2017)).
We first consider variables associated to empire building. Specifically, we test
whether CEO Owner is associated to changes in investments, assets, capex, ac-
quisition activities, cash holdings, leverage, dividends. None of these variables
appear significantly related to our treatment.
We then consider variables associated to quiet life. While direct measures of
CEO’s effort are hard to find, we can observe the number of employment relations
the CEO has in other firms (e.g. a second job, board membership, or consultancy).
We can also observe the number of days the CEO has been absent from work,
typically due to sick leave or for study reasons. In Table 8, we report our estimates
fixing the firm-CEO (columns 1 and 4), fixing the firm-owner (columns 2-3 and
5-6), and the IV as in Table 3 with CEO spouse’s health as instrument, restricting
to CEO spouses not working in the firm (columns 5-6). We observe that our
treatment induces the CEO to take fewer engagements outside the firm and fewer
days of absence from work, which is suggestive of increased effort in the firm.
The result is consistent with Bitler et al. (2005), who find a positive relation
between ownership shares and hours worked in a sample of U.S. entrepreneurs
and small firms. Bitler et al. (2005) also suggest that hours worked only captures
one aspect of increased incentives, and increased ownership may induce many
other managerial actions that increase firm value. Many of those actions are
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diffi cult to observe, hence conclusions can only be tentative. Yet, these results are
strongly suggestive that the quiet life hypothesis is a plausible mechanism behind




We perform a series of robustness checks, starting by alternative definitions of our
treatment. As mentioned, we attach no specific value to the 50% threshold in
terms of CEO ownership, and we now consider alternative thresholds. In column
1 of Table 9, we consider CEO 100, a dummy equal to one if the CEO is the only
owner. In column 2, we consider CEO 0, a dummy equal to one if the CEO holds
any positive fraction of firm’s shares. In column 3, we focus on CEO Largest,
that is a dummy indicating that the CEO is the largest (though not necessarily
the majority) shareholder. In column 4, we consider the continuous variable CEO
shares. In all these cases, the effect on firm productivity is similar to our main
estimates.
In particular, in column 4, we estimate that productivity increases by 1, 098
euros following an increase of CEO ownership by 100%. The effect is 8% larger
than the coeffi cient on CEO Owner in Table 2, which as mentioned corresponds to
an average change in CEO ownership of about 74%. This may suggest some con-
cavity in the effect of CEO ownership, but not strong enough to reject linearity.19
We explore more explicitly non-linear effects of CEO Shares in column 5 and find
no significant effect. As shown, these patterns are different in listed firms.
6.2 Productivity Measure
In Table 10, we report a set of robustness checks concerning our productivity
measure. In column 1, we consider gross operating surplus (GOS), defined as
value added minus personnel costs per unit of labor. In column 2, we consider net
profit margin, defined as net profit (value added minus personnel cost, overheads
and other costs, interest and taxes) over revenues. In column 3, we consider returns
19A similar picture emerges from the estimates in columns 1 and 2. The average change in
CEO ownership associated to a positive change in CEO 100 is 78% and it is −75% for a negative
change. The average change in CEO ownership associated to a positive change in CEO 0 is 63%
and it is −62% for a negative change. Out of all changes in CEO ownership, 20% of them are
associated to a change in CEO 100 and 64% are associated to a change in CEO 0.
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on assets, defined as net income over total assets. These regressions confirm that
CEO Owner is associated to higher operating effi ciency and profitability.
In column 4, we consider a standard estimate of TFP, obtained as the residual
of a Cobb-Douglas in which value added is regressed over capital and labor for each
2-digit industry. In column 5, we estimate TFP by adding the firm’s market share
and fixed effects at the industry-year level. Controlling for industry-specific time
trends is a simple way to account for possible biases due to inability to observe
firm prices (see Van Beveren (2012) and De Loecker and Goldberg (2014)). In
addition, in column 6, we exclude multiproduct firms that may be subject to price
shocks in different industries. Again, we observe a positive relation between CEO
Owner and firm productivity, and our coeffi cient of interest barely changes across
these specifications.20
6.3 Sample Selection
In Table 11, we consider possible biases due to sample selection. Importantly,
our sample is not selected in the sense that at each point in time we consider the
universe of firms, we do not restrict to survivors. Our fixed effects specifications
in equation (1) may also mitigate sample selection biases (Verbeek and Nijman
(1992)). As additional checks, we repeat our regressions in equation (1) on various
selected samples. In column 1, we restrict the sample to No Exit firms, these are
firms that do not die in our sample. In column 2, we consider Persistent firms,
defined as those firms with number of observations above the median, that is
equal to 8 (that is, half of our firms are in the sample for 8 years). We repeat the
same procedure in terms of firm-CEO pairs, considering in a similar way No Exit
firm-CEOs (column 3) and Persistent firm-CEOs, where the median number of
observations for firm-CEOs is 4 (column 4). The estimated impact of CEO Owner
is similar across the various specifications, and not statistically different from our
baseline estimates on the entire population. This limits the concerns that our
effects are biased due to sample selection.
6.4 Other specification tests
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 11, we consider specifications in which, instead of
firm-CEO fixed effects, we control for lagged values of the dependent variable
(one lag in column 5, and three lags in column 6). These specifications are more
20Similarly, controlling for industry-years fixed effects and market share in our baseline regres-
sions on labor productivity has no effect on our coeffi cient of interest.
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appropriate if unobserved characteristics are not time invariant within a given
firm-CEO pair, but they are instead better captured by time-varying individual-
specific past productivity patterns. Estimated effects are still positive and (not
significantly) smaller in size.21
In Table 12, we discuss the role of our control variables. We show that, while
in general our results change very little by changing the set of controls X
′
j,t or by
considering predetermined values X
′
j,t−1, controlling for ownership concentration
has an important effect. In column 1, to easen comparison, we report our baseline
specification (as in Table 2, column 4) as well as the coeffi cients associated to the
various control variables. In column 2, we include no controls, and we observe
that our treatment effects are smaller (in fact, they are almost half) relative to
the baseline estimates. As we show, our key control variable is the HHI index of
ownership concentration. In column 3, we include only the HHI index as control,
and observe that estimates are very similar to the baseline. If instead we include
all our controls except for the HHI index (column 4), estimates are very similar
to those without any control. In column 5, we use the lagged values X
′
j,t−1, and
observe similar results to those with no controls. This is again driven by ownership
concentration. Once we add the contemporaneous HHI index to the specification
(column 6), results are as in the baseline. Positive changes in our treatment
are typically associated to an increase in ownership concentration, and ownership
concentration is in itself negatively correlated to firm productivity, so omitting it
would push our OLS estimates downward.
6.5 IV specification
As mentioned, our health instruments do not rely on excluding direct effects of
CEO’s health at t on firm productivity at t. In columns 1-2 of Table 13, we add
health at t (that is, Zi,t) as control in our 2SLS estimates. In column 1, we see
that CEO’s health at t has a negative impact on firm productivity at t, while in
column 2 the impact of CEO spouse’s health is not significant. Irrespective of these
effects, our estimated impact of CEO Owner is not affected. In our specifications,
we fix the firm’s largest owner, and any variation to the treatment Ti,t is due to
changes in the identity of the CEO. In this case, CEO’s health at time t− 1 is not
correlated to health at t, precisely because the CEO is not the same.22
21See e.g. Guryan (2004) for a discussion on how fixed effects and lagged dependent variable
specifications provide bounds for the estimated causal effect.
22If this were not the case, we could have for example cases in which the CEO gets sick at
t − 1, she does not step down, but she rather sells her majority shares. We would observe a
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We also consider alternative definitions of our treatment CEO 100 and CEO
0, as defined in Section 3.2. Columns 3-4 present OLS estimates with firm-owner
fixed effects, columns 5-6 present IV estimates employing CEO spouse’s health as
instrument and restricting to CEO spouses not working in the firm. Results are
robust and consistent in all these specifications.
Finally, we consider alternative IV specifications. In columns 1-3 of in Table
14, we consider standard 2SLS estimates in which each instrument Zi,t−1 is directly
used in the first stage. In columns 4-6, we use probit regressions and the predicted
T̂i,t as instrument, but differently from equation (3) we include no interactions
with Ti,t−1. As instruments, we consider CEO retire, CEO’s health, and CEO
spouse’s health when the spouse is not employed in the firm. Estimated impacts
of CEO Owner are still positive and significant, confirming the robustness of our
findings. In Table 15, we replicate the specifications in Table 3 without our set
of controls X
′
i,t. We observe that, differently from the OLS estimates reported in
Table 12, results are very similar when omitting control variables and in particular
when omitting the HHI index of ownership concentration. The result is intuitive
since we now keep the identity of the main owner fixed (while in Table 12 we fix
the identity of the CEO), and it also useful to confirm the robustness of our IV
estimates to the possibility of omitted variables.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that agency costs are an important determinant of firm produc-
tivity. This result has been established both in OLS regressions with firm-CEO or
firm-owner fixed effects and in IV regressions in which we exploit health shocks of
the CEO and of the CEO spouse as a source of exogenous variation in ownership
and control. We believe these results are important as they establish in a direct
way the magnitude and scope of agency costs.
The possibility to exploit ownership data on the universe of limited liability
firms has allowed us to estimate agency costs also in samples which had not been
investigated in the previous literature. We have found agency costs to be particu-
larly relevant in medium-sized private firms, which are usually not the main focus
of corporate governance regulation. This finding can also have implications at the
macro level, since as mentioned in the introduction those firms have often been
change in the treatment, but not a change in the CEO, which may be problematic since for a
given CEO health at t− 1 is likely to be correlated to health at t and CEO health at t may in
turn affect firm productivity at t.
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cosidered key for economic growth and job creation.
Additional research is needed to better uncover the mechanisms behind agency
costs. An interesting next step would be to investigate more broadly how the
firm’s ownership structure affects its productivity. Beyond CEO ownership, one
can look at the distribution of ownership between large and small shareholders, or
between board members, employees and external investors.23 Another interesting
direction is to analyze how increased CEO effort improves firm value, the form
of this mapping has important implications for agency theory.24 Our analysis is
only a first step, we hope it can motivate further investigations and similar data
collection efforts in other countries.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
LP 566,266 53,695 41,844
CEO Owner 566,266 0.29 41.18
CEO 100 566,266 0.18 0.39
CEO 0 566,266 0.57 0.5
CEO Largest 566,266 0.39 0.49
CEO Share 566,266 0.36 0.39
CEO Share Value (10k) 566,266 19.97 101.06
GOS 565,526 13,571 24,995
Profit 565,302 -0.018 0.341
ROA 564,847 2.284 28.94
TFP 519,316 0.0009 0.52
TFP2 519,309 0.0009 0.52
CEO changes 566,266 0.36 0.47
Owner changes 566,266 0.08 0.28
Dependent 566,266 0.12 0.33
HHI ownership 566,266 5,484 3,656
Workers w/ Bac 566,266 10.88 94.1
Workers w/Master 566,266 1.37 24.82
Workers w/ PhD 566,266 0.07 1.74
White Collars 566,266 5.05 62.04
Blue Collars 566,266 11.09 117.91
CEO tenure 555,431 7.04 6.74
CEO age 566,266 44.68 10.33
CEO experience 536,651 19.46 5.31
CEO w/ Bac 566,266 0.12 0.33
CEO w/Master 566,266 0.11 0.31
CEO w/ PhD 566,266 0.01 0.08
Board size 566,266 4 3.1
Board shares 566,266 0.7 0.4
Board employees 566,266 1.6 1.6
CEO retires 566,266 0.04 0.197
CEO health benefits 566,266 98.83 978.19
Spouse health benefits 566,266 94.52 890.12
Micro 566,266 0.78 0.42
Small 566,266 0.18 0.39
Medium 566,266 0.03 0.18
Large 566,266 0.008 0.09
Services 566,266 0.64 0.48
Listed 566,266 0.001 0.038
SD(LP) 566,266 35,707 15,154
Free cash flow (1000) 566,266 121 274
Capex (1000) 566,266 64 221
Dividends 566,264 32,076 214,335
Leverage (D/E) 566,260 77,016 471,247
Investments 566,266 87,693 546,818
Acquisition activities 566,266 0.008 0.43
Assets (1000) 566,260 5,132 151,000
Spouse Works 566,266 0.127 0.333
Spouse Owns 566,266 0.331 0.471
Family 566,266 0.405 0.491
Founder 566,266 0.324 0.468
Professional CEO 566,266 0.031 0.173
CEO Engagement 555,688 1.241 0.739
CEO days leave 561,715 7.60 36.31
Note: This table reports summary statistics of all the
variables used in our analysis. Minimal and maximal
values cannot be reported due to confidentiality.
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Table 2: Main Result
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner -3,556 827.80 861.95 1,010 1,318
(-33.75)*** (7.22)*** (5.86)*** (3.34)*** (3.89)***
CEO Owner * Lagged CEO Owner -638.97
(-1.09)




Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed Effects No No Firm Firm-CEO
Number of Obs 566,266 555,406 555,406 566,260 313,789 566,260
Number of Groups 109,502 214,077 112,875 214,077
R-squared 0.001 0.173 0.015 0.013 0.019 0.013
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO
Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. Lagged CEO Owner is the
value of CEO Owner in the previous year. Owner changes is a dummy equal to one if the majority owner
in the firm changes in any previous period. In column 3, regressions include firm and year fixed effects. In
columns 4-6, regressions include firm-CEO and year fixed effects. In columns 4-6, controls include industry
fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the
number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership
concentration and board characteristics. In addition, in column 3, controls include CEO’s education, age,
years of experience within the firm and in total. Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Exogenous Variations
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Owner 784.18 1,632 1,519 1,508 1,554
(4.87)*** (2.75)** (2.52)** (2.50)** (2.09)**
Probit
Z(t-1) -0.797 -0.510 -0.134 -0.196
(-36.05)*** (-11.96)*** (-2.40)** (-3.05)***
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0.783 0.674 -0.050 0.063
(24.72)*** (9.17)*** (-0.65) (0.67)
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Health
(10k) (10k) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 555,406 367,895 367,895 367,895 289,991
Number of Groups 145,578 74,640 74,640 74,640 63,001
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (column 1) and of Probit and IV
regressions (columns 2-5). The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is
a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. The bottom panel
of columns 2-5 report probit regressions of equation (4). In column 2, the instrument
is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired in the previous period. In
column 3, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO in the
previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 4-5, the instrument is the amount of
health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In
column 5, the sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee
of the firm. All regressions include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include
industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part
of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white
vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration and board characteristics.
Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Exogenous Variations: Placebo
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Change 188.04 -5,524 -2,836 1,587 -2,848
(1.22) (-1.27) (-0.58) (0.33) (-0.55)
Probit
Z(t-1) 0.317 0.155 0.103 0.065
(26.71)*** (5.75)*** (4.27)*** (2.24)**
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Health
(10k) (10k) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 555,406 367,905 367,905 367,905 290,001
Number of Groups 145,578 74,641 74,641 74,641 63,002
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (column 1) and of Probit and IV
regressions (columns 2-5). The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Change
is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has changed in any previous period. The bottom
panel of columns 2-5 report probit regressions as in equation (4) without interactions
with T(t-1). In column 2, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is
classified as retired in the previous period. In column 3, the instrument is the amount
of health benefits received by the CEO in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In
columns 4-5, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO
spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In column 5, the sample is restricted
to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. All regressions include
firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits),
firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the
number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the
HHI index of ownership concentration and board characteristics. Standard errors are
clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Effects by Size and Industry
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 892.87 1,970 649.08 1,005 441,434















Treat CEO Owner CEO Shares
Sample All Listed
Number of Obs 313,789 313,789 313,785 313,789 313,789 839
Number of Groups 112,875 112,875 112,874 112,875 112,875 308
R-squared 0.019 0.018 0.021 0.019 0.018 0.098
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor
productivity. In columns 1-3, Treat is CEO Owner, that is a dummy equal to one if the
CEO has majority ownership in the firm. In columns 4-6, Treat is CEO Shares, that is
the fraction of CEO ownership in the firm. Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm
has 10-50 employees, Medium is a dummy equal to one if the firm has 51-250 employees,
Large is a dummy equal to one if the firm has more than 250 employees. Services is a
dummy equal to one if the firm is in the service sector. SD(LP) is the standard deviation
of labor productivity within the firm’s industry. Listed is a dummy equal to one if the
firm is listed. In column 6, the sample is restricted to listed firms. All regressions include
firm-CEO and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age,
leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers
by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership
concentration and board characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Exogenous Variations and Firm Size
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CEO Owner*Micro 948.39 812.05 620.41 1,336.48
(1.50) (1.27) (0.82) (1.17)
CEO Owner*Small 3,869.44*** 3,807.34*** 3,869.91*** 4,745.94***
(5.49) (5.36) (4.92) (3.93)
CEO Owner*Medium 5,658.67* 5,746.73* 6,067.31* 6,453.84
(1.87) (1.88) (1.93) (1.39)
CEO Owner*Large -88,763.47 -87,303.74 -110,919.38 47,120.85
(-0.51) (-0.50) (-0.65) (0.49)
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Health
(10k) (10k) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 368,724 368,724 368,734 211,084
Number of Groups 74,697 74,697 74,698 49,824
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of Probit and IV regressions. The dependent
variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO
has majority ownership in the firm, Micro is a dummy equal to one if the firm
has less than 10 employees, Small is a dummy equal to one if the firm has 10-
50 employees, Medium is a dummy equal to one if the firm has 51-250 employees,
Large is a dummy equal to one if the firm has more than 250 employees. In column
1, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired in
the previous period. In column 2, the instrument is the amount of health benefits
received by the CEO in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 3-4, the
instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the
previous period (in 10,000 euros). In column 4, the sample is restricted to cases
where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. All regressions include
firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits),
firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the
number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar),
the HHI index of ownership concentration and board characteristics. Standard
errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Family Firms and Founder Effect
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,320 1,106 1,286 1,529 547.68 1,009
(3.14)*** (2.57)** (2.85)*** (3.61)*** (0.40) (2.41)**
CEO Owner*Spouse Works -571.93
(-1.12)




CEO Owner*Founder -1,763 -315.32
(-2.23)** (-0.23)
CEO Owner*Professional CEO 791.93
(2.05)**
Number of Obs 313,789 313,789 313,789 313,789 84,105 313,789
Number of Groups 112,875 112,875 112,875 112,875 39,219 112,875
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor produc-
tivity. CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. Spouse
Works is a dummy equal to one if the CEO spouse is an employee in the firm. Spouse Owns is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO spouse holds some share in the firm. Family is a dummy equal to
one if the CEO spouse is an employee or holds some share in the firm. Founder is a dummy equal
to one if the firm was created during our sample and it has not changed the CEO. In column 5,
the sample is restricted to firms created during our sample. Professional CEO is a dummy equal
to one if the firm has at least two different CEOs or if the current CEO has worked in at least two
different firms during our sample. All regressions include firm-CEO and year fixed effects. Controls
include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part
of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue
collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration and board characteristics. Standard errors are




Dep Variable CEO Engagements CEO Days Off
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner -0.01 -0.18 -0.07 -1.41 -10.64 -4.65
(-1.75)* (-32.37)*** (-4.41)*** (-3.73)*** (-37.77)*** (-5.75)***
Fixed Effects Firm-CEO Firm-Owner Firm-CEO Firm-Owner
Estimates OLS IV OLS IV
Number of Obs 555,682 555,280 389,588 561,709 551,844 387,663
Number of Groups 209,292 145,561 96,391 212,669 144,798 96,109
R-squared 0.012 0.120 0.113 0.003 0.027 0.019
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (columns 1,2,4,5) and of IV regressions
(columns 3 and 6). In columns 1-3, the dependent variable is the number of employment rela-
tions of the CEO in other firms. In columns 4-6, the dependent variable is the number of days of
leave of the CEO. In columns 3 and 6, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by
the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros) and the sample is restricted to cases where
the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. In columns 1 and 4, regressions include firm-CEO
and year fixed effects. In columns 2,3,5 and 6, regressions include firm-owner and year fixed effects.
Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm
is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs.
blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration and board characteristics. Standard errors
are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 9: Robustness
Dep Variable Labor Productivity







CEO Shares 1,098 1,748
(4.17)*** (1.79)*
CEO Shares squared -715.46
(-0.71)
Number of Obs 566,260 566,260 566,260 566,260 566,260
Number of Groups 214,077 214,077 214,077 214,077 214,077
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent vari-
able is labor productivity. CEO 100 is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has
100% ownership in the firm. CEO 100 is a dummy equal to one if the CEO
has some ownership in the firm. CEO Largest is a dummy equal to one if the
CEO is the largest shareholder in the firm. CEO Share is the fraction of CEO
ownership in the firm. All regressions include firm-CEO and year fixed effects.
Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage, a dummy
indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level
of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership
concentration and board characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by firm,
t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 10: Robustness (2)
Dep Variable GOS Profit ROA TFP TFP2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,020 0.006 1.274 0.014 0.015 0.018
(4.16)*** (1.88)** (2.76)*** (2.79)*** (2.87)*** (3.38)***
Mean Dep Var 13,571 -0.018 2.28 0.001 0.0009
Number of Obs 565,526 565,768 556,007 564,847 556,000 513,033
Number of Groups 213,692 213,839 209,853 213,422 209,848 197,448
R-squared 0.017 0.009 0.024 0.007 0.007 0.007
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent
variable is Gross Operating Surplus. In column 2, the dependent variable is net profit
margin. In column 3, the dependent variable is Returns on Assets. In column 4, the
dependent variable is TFP, obtained as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas in which value
added is regressed over capital and labor for each 2 digit industry. In column 5, TFP is
estimated by adding firm’s market share and fixed effects for industry-years. In column
6, TFP is estimated as in column 5 but multiproduct firms are excluded. CEO Owner
is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. All regressions
include firm-CEO and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits),
firm’s age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number
of workers by level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of
ownership concentration and board characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by firm,
t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 11: Robustness (3)
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,056 956.48 1,197 1,177 556.28 687.80








No Exit Persistent No Exit Persistent
Fixed Effects Firm-CEO No
Number of Obs 418,856 318,219 256,232 313,962 308,546 121,616
Number of Groups 140,475 91,737 66,618 53,669
R-squared 0.012 0.016 0.012 0.015 0.609 0.693
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is labor pro-
ductivity. CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the
firm. In column 1, we restrict the sample to firms that do not die in our sample. In column 2,
we restrict the sample to firms with number of observations above the median (equal to 9). In
column 3, we restrict the sample to firm-CEO pairs that do not die in our sample. In column 2,
we restrict the sample to firm-CEO pairs with number of observations above the median (equal
to 4). In columns 5 and 6, LP(t-1)-LP(t-3) are lagged values of labor productivity with 1-3 lags.
Regressions in columns 1-4 include firm-CEO and year fixed effects, regressions in column 5-6
include year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age, leverage,
a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level of
education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration and
board characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 12: Robustness (4)
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
CEO Owner 1,010 515.99 1,006 590.92 655.60 1,210
(3.34)*** (2.11)** (3.31)*** (2.2)** (2.13)** (2.98)***
HHI Ownership -0.11 -0.08 -0.10
(-2.71)*** (-2.78)*** (2.19)**




Firm Age 237.78 230.79
(1.50) (1.46)
Firm Age-sq -2.66 -2.59
(-2.30)** (-2.24)**
Board Size -167.57 -162.57
(-4.13)*** (-4.03)***
Board Ownership 255.79 -201.06
(0.77) (0.79)
Workers in Board -61.95 -50.60
(-0.92) (-0.76)
Employees Bac -83.34 -83.33
(-2.88)*** (-2.88)***
Employees Master 103.62 103.52
(2.10)** (2.10)**
Employees PhD -572.65 -572.78
(-1.47) (-1.47)
White Collars -14.85 -14.82
(-0.72) (-0.72)
Blue Collars 48.34 48.33
(2.53)** (2.52)**
Business Group (lag) 361.70 343.81
(0.40) (0.38)
Leverage (lag) 0.002 0.002
(3.40)*** (3.40)***
Firm Age (lag) -3.99 -6.09
(-0.02) (-0.03)
Firm Age-sq (lag) 0.02 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Board Size (lag) 0.36 -0.38
(0.01) (-0.01)
Board Ownership (lag) 1,058.12 1,000.20
(2.80)*** (3.67)***
Workers in Board (lag) -0.86 -2.04
(-0.01) (-0.02)
HHI Ownership (lag) -0.01 -0.10
(-0.15) (-2.19)**
Employees Bac (lag) -32.62 -32.61
(-1.48) (-1.48)
Employees Master (lag) 245.77 245.86
(3.42)*** (3.42)***
Employees PhD (lag) -1,256.28 -1,255.97
(-2.54)** (-2.54)**
White Collars (lag) -51.66 -51.70
(-1.84)* (-1.84)*
Blue Collars (lag) -15.03 -15.08
(-0.69) (-0.69)
Number of Obs 566,260 566,266 566,266 566,266 313,789 313,789
Number of Groups 214,076 214,078 214,078 214,078 112,875 112,875
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions with firm-CEO and year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 13: Exogenous Variations: Robustness
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




CEO 100 720.71 1,146
(3.57)*** (2.13)**
CEO 0 636.46 4,406
(4.25)*** (2.26)**
Probit Probit
Z(t-1) -0.510 -0.196 -0.111 -0.218
(-11.96)*** (-3.05)*** (-1.28) (-4.72)***
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0.67 0.06 -0.027 0.13
(9.17)*** (0.67) (-0.21) (1.77)*
Instrument CEO Health Spouse Health Spouse Health
(10k) (not working) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 367,895 289,991 555,406 555,406 289,880 289,997
Number of Groups 74,640 63,001 145,578 145,578 62,982 63,002
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (columns 3-4) and of Probit and IV regressions
(columns 1-2 and 5-6). The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a dummy
equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. CEO 100 is a dummy equal to one
if the CEO has 100% ownership in the firm. CEO 100 is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has
some ownership in the firm. The bottom panel of columns 1-2 and 5-6 report probit regressions
of equation (4). In column 1, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the
CEO in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 2,5,6, the instrument is the amount
of health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros) and the
sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. In columns 1
and 2, Z(t) correspond to the amount of health benefits received the current period. All regressions
include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s
age, leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by
level of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration
and board characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗,
∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
41
Table 14: Exogenous Variations: Robustness (2)
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO Owner 1,727 1,486 1,449 3,644 3,084 3,274
(2.31)** (1.92)* (1.87)* (3.84)*** (3.23)** (3.44)***
First Stage Probit
Z(t-1) -0.146 -0.077 -0.007 -0.25 0.28 -0.198
(-16.70)*** (-5.8)*** (-0.55) (-17.36)*** (9.14)*** (-6.69)***
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0 .158 0.1 0.008
(16.70)*** ( 6.3)*** (0.57)
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Retire CEO Health Spouse
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 367,905 367,905 367,905 367,895 367,895 367,895
Number of Groups 74,641 74,641 74,641 74,640 74,640 74,640
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of IV and Probit regressions. The dependent variable is labor
productivity. CEO Owner is a dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the
firm. The bottom panel of columns 1-3 report first stage OLS regressions. The bottom panel
of columns 4-6 report probit regressions as in equation (4) without interactions with T(t-1). In
columns 1 and 4, the instrument is a dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired in the
previous period. In column 2 and 5, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the
CEO in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In columns 3 and 6, the instrument is the amount
of health benefits received by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros) and the
sample is restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. All regressions
include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Controls include industry fixed effect (2 digits), firm’s age,
leverage, a dummy indicating if the firm is part of a business group, the number of workers by level
of education and occupation (white vs. blue collar), the HHI index of ownership concentration and
board characteristics. Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗
and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 15: Exogenous Variations: Robustness (3)
Dep Variable Labor Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CEO Owner 970.55 1,651 1,537 1,515 2,041
(6.62)*** (2.46)** (2.26)** (2.23)** (2.38)**
Probit
Z(t-1) -0.774 -0.438 -0.13 -0.14
(-39.43)*** (-11.23)*** (-2.52)** (-2.49)**
Z(t-1)*(1-T(t-1)) 0.765 0.524 0.13 0.08
(27.29)*** (10.54)*** (1.94)* (1.00)
Instrument Retire CEO Health Spouse Health
(10k) (10k) (not working)
Fixed Effects Firm-Owner
Number of Obs 566,260 396,983 396,983 396,983 341,762
Number of Groups 146,799 97,261 97,262 97,263 91,045
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Note: This table reports results of OLS regressions (column 1) and of Probit and IV
regressions (columns 2-5). The dependent variable is labor productivity. CEO Owner is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO has majority ownership in the firm. The bottom panel
of columns 2-5 report probit regressions of equation (4). In column 2, the instrument is a
dummy equal to one if the CEO is classified as retired in the previous period. In column 3,
the instrument is the amount of health benefits received by the CEO in the previous period
(in 10,000 euros). In columns 4-5, the instrument is the amount of health benefits received
by the CEO spouse in the previous period (in 10,000 euros). In column 5, the sample is
restricted to cases where the CEO spouse is not an employee of the firm. All regressions
include firm-owner and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm, t-statistics
are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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